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Abstract
We consider the truthful implementation of the socially e¢ cient allocation in a
dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over
time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism,
based on the marginal contribution of each agent, leads to truthtelling in every period.
A leading example of a dynamic allocation model is the sequential auction of a single
good in which the current winner of the object receives additional information about
her valuation. We show that a modi…ed sequential second price auction in which only
the current winner makes a positive payment leads to truthtelling. In general allocation
problems, the marginal contribution mechanism continues to induce truthtelling in every
period but may now include positive transfers for many agents.
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Introduction

The seminal analysis of second price auctions by Vickrey (1961) established that single or
multiple unit discriminatory auctions can be used to implement the socially e¢ cient allocation in private value models in (weakly) dominant strategies. The subsequent contributions
by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that the insight of Vickrey extends to more
general allocation problems in private value environments. By requiring that the transfer
payment of agent i match her externality cost on the remaining agents, agent i internalizes
the social objective and is led to report her type truthfully. The resulting net utility for
agent i corresponds to her marginal contribution to the social value.
In this paper, we generalize the idea of a marginal contribution mechanism to dynamic
environments with private information. We design an intertemporal sequence of transfer
payments which allow each agent to receive her ‡ow marginal contribution in every period.
In other words, each agent will pay her externality cost in a time consistent manner. In
consequence, each agent is willing to truthfully report her information in every period.
The basic idea of the dynamic mechanism is …rst explored in the context of the sequential
allocation of an indivisible object with initially uncertain value to the bidders. We assume
that the initial estimate of the value is private information to the bidder. In subsequent
periods, a bidder receives additional information only in those periods in which the object is
allocated to her. The structure of the payo¤s in the model, and in particular the resolution
of uncertainty, therefore resembles the multi-armed bandit problem.
The …rst result reports the construction of a dynamically e¢ cient auction that allocates
the object in each period according to the utilitarian welfare criterion under symmetric but
imperfect information. We show that a dynamic second price auction truthfully implements
the socially e¢ cient allocation period by period subject to Bayesian (and in fact even subject
to ex post) incentive constraints. The bandit framework constitutes a natural setting to
analyze the repeated allocation of an object or a license over time. The key assumption in
the multi-armed bandit setting is that only the current user gains more information about
her valuation of the object. If we think about the object as a license to use a facility or to
explore a resource for a limited time, it is natural to assume that the current insider gains
information relative to the outsiders. A conceptual advantage of the sequential allocation
problem is that the structure of the socially e¢ cient program is well understood. As the
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monetary transfers allow each agent to capture her marginal contribution, the properties
of the social program translate into properties of the marginal program. In the case of the
dynamic auction, we therefore obtain surprisingly explicit and informative expressions for
the intertemporal transfer prices.
The second result is the description of a dynamic Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism in
which each agent receives in every period her ‡ow marginal contribution to the social value.
We obtain the second result for a general speci…cation of the utility of each agent and the
arrival of private information over time. Throughout the paper we maintain the assumptions
of quasi-linear utility and of a private value environment.
The objective of the dynamic mechanism is to implement the socially e¢ cient policy.
With transferable utilities, the social objective is simply to maximize the expected discounted sum of the individual utilities. The solution to this dynamic optimization problem
is by necessity time consistent. In consequence, the dynamic Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism is time consistent and the social choice function can be implemented by a sequential
mechanism without any ex ante commitment by the designer. In contrast, in revenue maximizing problems, the “ratchet e¤ect” leads to very distinct solutions for mechanisms with
and without intertemporal commitment ability (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)).
In contrast to the static environment, the thruthtelling strategy in the dynamic setting
forms an ex-post equilibrium rather than an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
The weakening of the equilibrium notion is due to the dynamic nature of the game. If
the connection between other agents’ current announcements and their implications on
the future continuation payo¤s is broken, then truthtelling is not necessarily individually
optimal.
In recent years, a number of papers have been written with the aim to explore various
issues arising in dynamic allocation problems. Athey and Segal (2006) consider a …nite
time horizon model with transferable utilities and private values. Their main result is the
construction of a balanced budget mechanism in the …nite horizon allocation model. Their
construction of a rebalancing mechanism is based on a “team mechanism” in which the
monetary transfers are paid only at the terminal period and are equal to the sum of the other
agents’terminal utilities. In contrast, we design a sequence of transfers which support the
‡ow marginal contribution as the net utility of each agent in every period. In consequence
we do not need a …nite terminal time to establish the transfers. Bapna and Weber (2005)
3

consider a sequential allocation problem for a single, indivisible object by a dynamic auction.
The basic optimization problem is a multi-armed bandit problem as in the auction we discuss
here. Their analysis attempts to use the Gittins index of each alternative allocation as a
su¢ cient statistic for the determination of the transfer price. While the Gittins index is
su¢ cient to determine the e¢ cient allocation in each period, the indices, in particular the
second highest index is typically not a su¢ cient statistic for the incentive compatible transfer
price. Bapna and Weber (2005) present necessary and su¢ cient conditions when an a¢ ne
but report-contingent combination of indices can represent the externality cost. In contrast,
we consider a direct mechanism and determine the transfers from general principles of the
incentive problem. In particular we do not require any assumptions beyond the private value
environment and transferable utility. In symmetric information environments, Bergemann
and Välimäki (2003), (2006) use the notion of marginal contribution to construct e¢ cient
equilibria in dynamic …rst price auctions. In this paper, we emphasize the role of a timeconsistent utility ‡ow, namely the ‡ow marginal contribution, to encompass environments
with private information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic auction model. Section 3 contains the construction of the e¢ cient dynamic auction. Section 4 extends the
construction to general private value environments. Section 5 concludes.

2

Model

Setting We consider a dynamic auction model in discrete time with an in…nite horizon.
In every period t; a single indivisible object can be allocated to a bidder i 2 f1; :::; N g. The
true valuation of bidder i is given by ! i 2

i

= [0; 1]. The prior distribution about the

valuation ! i is given by Fi (! i ) and the distributions are independent across bidders. In
period 0, bidder i does not know the realization of ! i , instead she receives an informative
signal s0i 2 Si = [0; 1] about her true value of the object. The signal si is generated by a
conditional distribution function Gi (si j! i ). In each subsequent period t, only the winning
bidder in period t

1 receives additional information about her valuation ! i in the form of

an additional and conditionally independent signal sti 2 Si from the conditional distribution

Gi (si j! i ). Each signal sti is private information to bidder i and is not observed by any other
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agent.1
We denote the private history of bidder i by hti = s0i ; :::; sti

1

: The posterior belief of

agent i about ! i can be calculated by Bayes’rule using hti : The expected value of the object
for bidder i given his private history is denoted by:
vi hti = E ! i hti .
Each agent i has quasi-linear utility and the net value of getting the object in period t is
vi hit

pti ;

where pti is the transfer price paid in period t. Each agent discounts the future with a
common discount factor ; 0 <
Mechanism

< 1.

A dynamic direct mechanism asks the bidders to report their signals in every

period t. The report sbti may or may not be truthful. We de…ne the initial reports by
b
h0 = sb01 ; :::; sb0N ;

and inductively the history of reports by:

b
ht = b
ht

1

; sbt1 ; :::; sbtN .

b t . The allocation rule for
The set of possible histories of reports in period t is denoted by H

a dynamic direct revelation mechanism is

b t ! [0; 1]N :
xt : H

The allocation in period t is a vector xt = xt1 ; :::; xtN ; where xti denotes the probability of
assigning the object to i in t with
N
X

xti = 1.

i=1

The transfer (or pricing) rule is given by:

1

b t ! RN :
pt : H

We describe the arrival of new information as a Bayesian sampling process. The equilibrium character-

ization in Theorem 1 would continue to hold for any stochastic process, possibly non-Markovian, provided
that the signal realizations are independent across agents and that signals only arrive for winning bidders.

5

D
E
b is a triple where
A dynamic mechanism M = x; p;H
x = xt

1
;
t=0

p = pt

1
t=0

and

n o1
b = H
bt
;
H
t=0

are the sequences of public decisions and public reports (histories).
Equilibrium

The bidders evaluate payo¤s according to the discounted expected payo¤

criterion. A reporting strategy for agent i is a mapping
mti : Si ! Si .
For a given mechanism M, the expected payo¤ for bidder i from reporting a sequence

b
si = fb
sti g of signals given that the others are reporting b
s
E

1
X
t=0

t

h

xti b
ht

1

; sbti ; sbt

i

vi hti

i

= fb
st i g is given by

pti b
ht

1

; sbti ; sbt

i

i

:

Given the mechanism M and the reporting strategies b
s i , the optimal reporting strategy
of bidder i solves a sequential optimization problem which can phrased recursively in terms
of value functions, or
Vi (b
ht

1

n
; hti ) = max E xti b
ht
sbti 2Si

1

; sbti ; sbt

i

pti b
ht

vi hti

1

; sbti ; sbt

i

o

+ Vi b
ht ; ht+1
i

:

We say that the dynamic direct mechanism M is Bayesian incentive compatible, if for every
agent i, in every period t, truthtelling is a best response given that all other agents report
truthfully. In terms of the value function, it means that for all i and all t, the solution to
the dynamic programming equation:
Vi (ht

1

) = max E xti ht
sbti 2Si

1

; sbti ; st

i

vi hti

pti ht

1

; sbti ; st

i

+ V i ht

1

; sbti ; st

:

i

is to report truthfully, i.e. to choose sbti = sti . Finally, we say that the mechanism M is
ex post incentive compatible if truthtelling is a best response for agent i regardless of the
distribution of signals of the other agents, or
si 2 arg max xti ht
sbti 2Si

1

; sbti ; st

i

vi hti

pti ht

1

; sbti ; st

i

+ V i ht

1

; sbti ; st

i

;

for all st i 2 S i . In the dynamic context, ex post incentive compatibility has to be quali…ed in the sense that is ex post with respect to all signals received in period t, but not
ex post with respect to signals arriving after period t. Consequently, the value function
V i ht

1; s
bti ; st i

is still the future expected value conditional on ht
6

1; s
bti ; st i .

3

Dynamic Auction

We start with the single good allocation problem and show that it is possible to implement
the socially e¢ cient allocation in ex post equilibrium (and hence in Bayesian Nash equilibrium). The construction resembles to some extent a second price auction in each period.
The transfer price of the winning bidder is calculated in each period by comparison to the
optimal allocation policy within the set of bidders where the current winner is excluded.
As a result, the winning bidder internalizes her e¤ect on the welfare of other bidders. The
transfer price of the loosing bidders will be equal to zero provided that only the winning
bidder receives additional information. The exact construction of the transfer prices follows the spirit of the Vickrey pricing, but the intertemporal trade-o¤s are fully taken into
account.
Social E¢ ciency The socially e¢ cient assignment policy is obtained by maximizing the
utilitarian welfare criterion, namely the expected discounted sum of utilities. Given a history
of signals hs in period s, the socially optimal program can be written simply as
W (hs ) =

max1 E

fxt (ht )gt=s

1 X
N
X

t s t
xi

ht vi hti :

t=s i=1

Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:
(N
)
X
s
s
s
s
s s
W (h ) = max E
xi (h ) vi (hi ) + W (h ; x ) :
xs (hs )

The expected value EW
the state

hs

(hs ; xs )

i=1

represents the optimal continuation value conditional upon

and the allocation xs today. The socially optimal assignment problem is a

standard multi–armed bandit problem and the optimal policy is characterized by an index
policy (see Gittins (1989) and Whittle (1982) for a textbook introduction). In particular,
we compute for every bidder i the Gittins index based exclusively on the information about
bidder i. The index of bidder i in state hti is the solution to the following optimal stopping
problem:
i

hti = max E

(P

s

s=0

The socially e¢ cient allocation policy x = xt

P

vi ht+s
i
s

s=0
1
is
t=0

)

to choose in every period a bidder

i with the maximal index:
xti > 0 if

i

hti

j
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htj

:

for all j:

Marginal Contribution In the static Vickrey auction, the price of the winning bidder
is equal to the highest valuation among the loosing bidders. The highest value among
the remaining bidders represents the social opportunity cost of assigning the object to the
winning bidder. In a dynamic framework, the social opportunity cost is determined by the
optimal continuation plan in the absence of the current winner. It is therefore useful to
de…ne the value of the social program after removing bidder i from the set of agents:
W

i (h

s

)=

1 X
X

max 1 E
fxt i (ht )gt=s t=s

t s t
xj

ht vj htj :

j6=i

The marginal contribution Mi ht of bidder i at history ht is then naturally de…ned by:
Mi ht = W ht

W

i

ht :

(1)

The marginal contribution is the change in social value due to the addition of agent i and
hence the possibility of assigning the object to i. The marginal contribution of agent i
may be thought of as the information rent that agent i may be able to secure for herself in
the direct mechanism. If bidder i can secure her marginal contribution in a time consistent
manner, she should be able to receive the ‡ow marginal contribution mi ht in every period.
The ‡ow marginal contribution accrues incrementally over each period:
Mi ht = mi ht + Mi ht ; xt

:

As in the notations of the value functions above, Mi ht ; xt represents the marginal contribution of agent i in the continuation problem conditional on the history ht and the
allocation xt today. The ‡ow marginal contribution can be expressed more directly using
the de…nition of the marginal contribution (1) as
mi ht = W ht

W

i

ht

W ht ; x

t

W

i

ht ; xt

.

(2)

Dynamic Second Price Auction The ‡ow marginal contribution is a natural candidate
for the net utility that each bidder should receive in each period t. We now construct a
transfer price such that under the e¢ cient allocation, each bidder’s net payo¤ coincides
with her ‡ow marginal contribution. We then show that this pricing rule makes truthtelling
incentive compatible in the dynamic mechanism.
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The winning bidder i receives the object in period t. To match her net payo¤ to her
‡ow marginal contribution, we must have:
mi ht = vi ht

pi h t :

(3)

The remaining bidders, j 6= i, do not receive the object in period t and their transfer price
must o¤set the ‡ow marginal contribution:
mj h t =

pj h t :

Consider …rst the e¢ cient bidder i in period t. We expand the ‡ow marginal contribution
in (2) by noting that i is the e¢ cient assignment and that another bidder, say k, would
constitute the e¢ cient assignment in the absence of bidder i:
mi ht = vi hti

vk htk

W

ht ; i

i

W

i

ht ; k

:

(4)

The optimal assignment policy is without loss of generality a deterministic policy as a
function of the history. We therefore replace the vector xt by the assignment decision which
determines the identity of the winning bidder. Thus, in (4), W

i

ht ; i and W

i

ht ; k

represent the continuation value of the social program without i, conditional on the history
ht and the current assignment being i or k

i

respectively. We notice that with private values,

the continuation value of the social program without i and conditional on ht and giving the
object to agent i in period t is simply equal to the value of the program conditional on ht
alone, or
W

i

ht ; i = W

i

ht :

The additional information generated by the assignment to agent i only pertains to agent
i and hence has no value for the allocation problem once i is removed. We can therefore
rewrite the ‡ow marginal contribution of the winning agent i as:
mi ht = vi hti

(1

)W

i

ht :

The ‡ow marginal contribution of i is therefore her expected ‡ow value minus the delay
in the accrual of the social bene…t arising from the optimal assignment among all agents
excluding agent i. It follows that the transfer price should simply be given by:
pi ht = (1

)W
9

i

ht ,

(5)

which is the ‡ow social opportunity cost of assigning the object today to agent i.
A similar analysis, based on the ‡ow marginal contribution (4) leads to the determination
of the transfer price for the losing bidders. Consider a bidder j who should not get the object
in period t. Her ‡ow utility is clearly zero in period t. Moreover, by the optimality of the
index policy, the removal of alternative j from the set of possible allocations does not change
the optimal assignment today. In consequence, the identity of the winning bidder does not
depend on the presence of alternative j. In other words the e¢ cient assignment to i will
remain e¢ cient after we remove j. As a result the ‡ow marginal contribution of the loosing
bidder is zero, and we have:
pj h t =

mj ht = 0.

Theorem 1 (Dynamic Second Price Auction)
The socially e¢ cient allocation rule x is ex post incentive compatible in the dynamic direct
mechanism with the payment rule p where:
8
< (1
)W
pj h t =
:
0

j

ht

if xtj = 1;
if xtj = 0:

Proof. By the unimprovability principle, it is su¢ cient to prove that if an agent receives

in all future periods her marginal contribution as her continuation value, then truthtelling is
incentive compatible for an agent in period t. Suppose then that at ht , it is socially e¢ cient
to assign the object to agent i and suppose that all agents except i report truthful. The
incentive constraint for agent i is then given by:
vi hti

pi h t + M i h t ; i

M i ht ; j

(6)

for some j 6= i. By the determination of the transfer price pi , it follows that (6) can be
written as follows
Mi h t

M i ht ; j

(7)

and by de…nition of the marginal contribution, we can rewrite (7) in terms of the social
value functions:
W ht

W

i

ht

W ht ; j

W

i

ht ; j

;

and expanding by vi hti , we have
W ht

W

i

ht

vi hti + W ht ; j
10

vi hti

W

i

ht ; j ;

but then the result is:
W ht

W ht ; j

W

i

ht

W

i

ht ; j :

(8)

The inequality (8) follows from the fact that the size of the loss due to a suboptimal choice
j (weakly) increases in the number of alternatives present.
For the case of an ine¢ cient agent j in period t, we have
Mj h t

vj htj

pj ht + M j ht ; j .

(9)

As the transfer price is independent of the report of agent j, and given by (5), we can
rewrite (9) as follows
Mj ht

vj htj

(1

)W

j

ht + M j ht ; j .

After replacing the marginal contributions by the social value functions, we have
W ht
But as W

j

W

j

ht

ht ; j = W

vj htj
j

(1

)W

j

ht +

W ht ; j

W

ht , the terms involving the value functions of

j

ht ; j

.

j all drop out

and we are left with
W ht

vj htj + W ht ; j ,

(10)

which is a valid inequality since j is by hypothesis not the e¢ cient choice in period t.
The incentive compatible pricing rule has a few interesting implications. First, we
observe that in the case of two bidders, the formula for the dynamic second price reduces to
the static solution. If we remove one bidder, the social program has no other choice but to
always assign it to the remaining bidder. But then, the expected value of that assignment
policy is simply equal to the expected value of the object for bidder j in period t by the
martingale probability of the Bayesian posterior. In other words, the transfer is equal to the
current expected value of the next best competitor. With more than two bidders, the social
program without bidder i will contain an option value due to the possibility of assigning the
object to the more favorable bidder. In consequence the social opportunity cost is higher
than the highest expected valuation among the remaining bidders.
Second, we observe that the transfer price of the winning bidder is independent of her
own information about the object. This means, that for any number of periods in which the
11

ownership of the object does not change, the transfer price will stay constant as well, even
though the valuation of the object by the winning bidder may undergo substantial change.
The design of the transfer price pursued the objective to match the ‡ow marginal contribution of every agent in every period. The determination of the transfer price is based
exclusively on the reported signals of the other agents, rather than their true signals. For
this reason, truthtelling is not only Bayesian incentive compatible, but ex post incentive
compatible, if we qualify ex post to mean conditional on all signals received up to and
including period t.
An important insight from the static analysis of the private value environment is the
fact that incentive compatibility can be guaranteed in weakly dominant strategies. This
strong result does not carry over into the dynamic setting due to the interaction of the
strategies. In a dynamic setting, each agent can condition her strategy on the past reports
of the other agents. In particular, the strategy of truthtelling after all histories fails to be
a weakly dominant strategy as it removes the ability to respond to past announcements.
Yet our argument shows that the weaker condition of ex post incentive compatibility can
be satis…ed.
The vital assumption in the dynamic auction model pertained to the ‡ow of information:
Each bidder receives additional private information in period t + 1 if and only if she received
the object in period t. This is the essential informational hypothesis in multi-armed bandit
framework. Yet we might be interested in a setting in which each bidder may learn more
about the value of the object even in periods in which she does not control the object.
The incentive analysis is again based on the ‡ow marginal contribution. But once we leave
the bandit framework, then some loosing bidders may have to pay a positive price even in
periods in which they do not receive the object. Consider a loosing bidder j and suppose
that the removal of bidder j would change the e¢ cient assignment policy from agent i to
agent k. The ‡ow contribution of the loosing bidder j would now be equal to:
mj ht = vi hti

vk htk +

W

j

ht ; i

W

j

ht ; k

< 0:

In other words, if the presence of j changes the e¢ cient assignment policy, then this leads
to an externality cost created by agent j and hence strictly positive transfer prices even in
periods in which agent j does not receive the object.
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4

General Private Value Environment

In this section we extend the private value environment from a single unit auction to a
general allocation model. In addition, we substantially generalize the statistical model of
information. The net expected ‡ow utility of agent i in period t is now determined by the
(‡ow) allocation at 2 A, the private history hti and the transfer price pti :
vi at ; hti

pti .

The utility function vi represents the expected utility to agent i from an allocation at given
the private information hti . The set of available allocations is given by a compact and time
invariant set A. The private signal of agent i in period t + 1 is generated according to a
conditional distribution function:
st+1
i

Gi st+1
at ; hti :
i

We generalize the information ‡ow by allowing the signal st+1
of agent i in period t + 1
i
to be dependent on the current allocative decision at and the entire past history of private
signals received by agent i. The allocation rule for the direct mechanism is now given by

and the transfer rules are given by:

bt !
xt : H

(A) ;

b t ! RN :
pt : H

1

As before, we denote the socially e¢ cient policy by x = xt t=0 . The direct dynamic
D
E
b extends the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to general inmechanism M = x ; p ;H
tertemporal environments by the marginal contribution argument as developed earlier in
the context of the single unit allocation problem.
Theorem 2 (Dynamic Vickrey Groves Clark Mechanism)
The socially e¢ cient allocation rule fx g is ex post incentive incentive compatible with the
payment rule p :
pti

x

ht ; h t

i

= mi ht

13

vi x

ht ; hti :

(11)

Proof. The basic idea of the proof generalizes the marginal contribution argument
in Theorem 1. By the unimprovability principle, it su¢ ces to prove that if agent i will
receive as her continuation value her marginal contribution, then truthtelling is incentive
compatible for agent i in period t, or:
vi x

ht ; hti

pti x

ht ; h t

i

ht ; h t

+ Mi x

vi a; hti

pti a; ht + Mi ht ; a ;
(12)

for all i; t and a 2 A. By construction of the transfer price, the lhs of (12) represents
the marginal contribution of agent i. Similarly, we can express the continuation marginal
contribution Mi ht ; a in terms of the values of the di¤erent social programs:
W ht

W

ht

i

vi a; hti

pti a; ht

W ht ; a

+

i

W

i

ht i ; a

:

(13)

By construction of the transfer price, we can represent the price that agent i would have to
pay if allocation a were to be chosen in terms of the marginal contribution if the reported
history hti were the true signal received by agent i. By construction, we have as in (11):
pti

h t ; h t = mi h t

x

vi x

ht ; hti :

The ‡ow marginal contribution of agent i is given by
mi hti ; ht

i

=

I
X

vj a; hti ; ht

X

i

j=1

vj x i ; ht

+

i

W

i

ht i ; a

W

i

ht i ; x

:

i

j6=i

(14)

so that the price is given by:
pti ht =

X

vj x i ; ht

i

j6=i

X

vj a; hti ; ht

i

+

W

i

ht i ; x

W

i

i

ht i ; a

: (15)

j6=i

We can now insert the prices into (13) to obtain:
W ht
vi a; ht

W i ht i
0
X
@
vj x i ; ht

X

i

j6=i

vj a; hti ; ht

i

+ W

i

ht i ; x

j6=i

i

1

A+

W ht ; a

But now we can reconstitute the entire expression in terms of the social value of the program
with and without agent i and we are lead to the …nal inequality:
W ht

W

i

ht

i

W ht ; a
14

W

i

ht

i

;

:

where the later is true by the optimality of x at ht .
We observe that the pricing rule (11) for agent i depends on the report of agent i only
through the determination of the social allocation which already appeared as a prominent
feature in the static environment. Theorem 2 gives a general characterization of the transfer
prices. In speci…c environment (such as a public good provision model), we can then gain
additional insights into the structure of the e¢ cient transfer prices by analyzing how the
policies would change with the addition or removal of an arbitrary agent i.

5

Conclusion

This paper suggest the construction of a direct dynamic mechanism in private value environments with transferable utility. The design of the monetary transfers relies on the
notions of marginal contribution and ‡ow marginal contribution. These notions allow us
to transfer the insights of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism from a static environment
to general dynamic settings. In the case of the sequential allocation of a single indivisible
object, we show that the notion of marginal contribution and its relationship to the social
program allow us to give explicit solutions of the monetary transfers in each period.
Many interesting questions are left open. The dynamic mechanism considered here satis…es the incentive compatibility and individual participation constraints in every period. In
particular, we do not require that the monetary transfer satisfy a balanced budget condition
in every period. The recent analysis of Athey and Segal (2006) suggests that a sequential
version of AGV mechanism might be able to achieve budget balancing in every period as
well. This paper is silent on the issue of revenue maximizing mechanisms. In order to
make progress in that direction, a characterization of implementable allocations in dynamic
setting will …rst be necessary. Finally, we restricted our attention to private value environments. A recent literature, beginning with Maskin (1992) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2000)
showed how to extend the VCG mechanism to interdependent value environments. In dynamic settings, the single crossing condition will then typically involve a dynamic element
which will introduce some complications. These tasks are left for future research.
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